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INTRODUCTION

One of the primary responsibilities of a personal representative
engaged in the administration of a decedent's estate is to marshal all
of the claims against that estate. A personal representative has three
basic functions to perform: to collect assets, pay debts, and make
distribution. Statutory procedure controls the presentation of claims.
The statutes are commonly called nonclaim statutes. The late Professor
Thomas E. Atldnson, an acclaimed scholar in the area of succession
law, has stated that nonclaim statutes fix a definite time limit within
which claims against decedents must be processed., The purpose of
nonclaim legislation is to provide relief from uncertainty when late
claims are filed and to prevent unnecessary delay in estate administration.2 A nonclaim statute, and companion legislation relating to the
processing of claims, together manifest "a clear policy and purpose to
facilitate and effectuate a speedy settlement of estates in so far as
such goal can be accomplished with fairness and justice towards all."3

*Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.A., 1957, Yale University; J.D., 1960, Boston

University.
1. See T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 690 (2d ed. 1953).
2. Id.
3. Wilson & McGehee, Probate Claims in Florida, 1 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1948).
3a5
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Florida's nonclaim statute is Florida Statutes, section 733.702, 4
which is part of the Florida Probate Code. This statute, by its literal language, requires the personal representative to present a claim within
three months after the first publication of the notice of administration.
This three months filing requirement, however, is a very short period
of time for claimants to act. For many years the nonclaim period was
one year.6 This period of time was later reduced to eight months,7
then to six months,8 then to four months, 9 and finally, today, under
the Florida Probate Code, three months. 10
This article examines a particular aspect of the processing of claims
under the Florida nonclaim statute. The focus is on the exceptions to

4. For purposes of this article, '"nonclain terminology" is used in the broad sense. The
Florida Supreme Court in Barnett Bank v. Estate of Read, 493 So. 2d 447, 488-89 (Fla. 1986)
has stated that FLA. STAT. § 733.702 (1985) is a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional
statute of nonclaim. The best approach is to consider this statute as a particular or special type
of statute of limitations; one that is enforced more rigorously than a normal statute of limitations.
FLA. STAT. § 733.702 (Supp. 1988) is known to Florida attorneys as the nonclaim statute because
it limits the time for filing claims against a decedent's estate. Nomenclature regarding this
statute probably will not change in the future. In fact, even after Read, one court has called
this statute section a "strict statute of nonclaim." See Brown v. Taylor, 500 So. 2d 309, 311
(Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1986).
5. FLA. STAT. § 733.702 (Supp. 1988). Florida case law has determined that notice by
publication is sufficient to bar a creditor, whose existence is known by the personal representative
of a decedent's estate, who files beyond the nonclaim time period. See Public Health Trust v.
Estate of Jara, 521 So. 2d 309, 310 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1988); Coley v. Estate of Odom, 500 So.
2d 188, 189 (1st D.C.A. 1986), review denied, 506 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1987). See also Smith,
Known Estate CreditorsandNotice by Publication:A Due ProcessIssue Is Resolved in Florida,
FLA. B.J. 71 (Oct. 1987). However, these Florida cases no longer control due to the United
States Supreme Court decision of Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Estate of Pope,
108 S.Ct. 1340 (1988). This case concerned an Oklahoma statute which is similar to FLA. STAT.
§ 733.702(1)(a) (Supp. 1988). Under Oklahoma's nonclaim provision claims must be filed within
two months of the publication of notice rather than within the three months allowed in Florida; however, this time difference will not make the case inapplicable to Florida estates. Pope
held that if a party's identity as a creditor is known or is reasonably ascertainable by the
personal representative, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution requires that the creditor be given notice by mail or such other means to
ensure actual notice of the running of the nonclaim period. This case involved claims "arising
upon a contract." After the Pope decision, in a new opinion on recall of mandate, Public Health
Trust v. Estate of Jara, 526 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1988) determined that notice of probate
proceedings by publication to known creditors is constitutionally insufficient. See also Smith &
Winick, Known orAscertainableEstateCreditors:The Pope Decision, FLA. B.J. 66 (Oct. 1988).
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See FLA. Comp. GEN. LAWS § 5597 (1927).
See FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1933).
See FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1963).
See FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1973).
See FLA. STAT. § 733.702(1)(a) (Supp. 1988).
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an apparent statutory bar to the initial filing requirement of the person
having a claim or demand against the decedent's estate. If no statutory
exception exists, then claims not presented within the designated three
month time period are not "binding""' or are "barred."'2 This apparent
bar is to expedite fair administration of the estate. From the public
policy standpoint, two conflicting propositions must be balanced: (1)
claims of creditors should be paid, and (2) property distribution of a
decedent must not be delayed for a long period of time.
Once a claim has been properly filed it becomes subject to the
provisions of Florida Statutes, section 733.705.13 This statutory section,
as well as prior legislation, constitutes "rules of judicial procedure"
as contrasted to a nonclaim statute. 14 Accordingly, the court has discretion to relax the time limitations. 5 The statute initially permits the
personal representative to object to any claim that has been filed,
provided the objection occurs on or before the expiration of four
months from the first publication of the notice of administration, or
within thirty days from the filing of the claim, whichever is later."
When a timely objection is filed, the personal representative must
serve a copy of the objection on the claimant not later than ten days
after filing.' 7 Failure to serve a copy of the objection constitutes abandonment of the objection.', When an objection is fied and properly
served, the claimant has thirty days to bring an independent action
upon the claim. 19 If a proper action is not brought the claim is forever
barred.-' But the Florida Statutes, section 733.705, states:

11. Id. § 733.702(1).
12. Id. § 733.212(3).
13. Id. § 733.705. For the full text of this section, see Appendix II.
14. See In re Estate of Sale, 227 So. 2d 199, 201 (Fla. 1969); In re Estate of Goldman, 79
So. 2d 846, 847 (Fla. 1955); In re Jeffries' Estate, 136 Fla. 410, 420, 181 So. 833, 838 (1938);
In re Estate of Hammer, 511 So. 2d 708, 711 (Fla.4th D.C.A. 1987); Williams v. Estate of
Williams, 493 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1986); Golden v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 481 So. 2d
16, 18 (1st D.C.A. 1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1986); In re Estate of Dezso,
382 So. 2d 399, 400 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1980); In re Estate of Oxford, 372 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (2d
D.C.A. 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1980); In re Estate of Kemp, 177 So. 2d 757,

759 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1965).
15.
16.

See cases cited supra note 14.
FLA. STAT. § 733.705(2) (Supp. 1988).

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 733.705(3). This statute subsection, as it existed in 1987, also required the claimant
to file written notice of such an action in the estate proceeding. A recent case held this requirement unconstitutional. See Z & 0 Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Lakow, 519 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1987) (filing of such informational notice was essentially procedural and thus an unconstitutional

invasion of the exclusive rulemaking power of the Florida Supreme Court). This case conflicts
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For good cause, the court may extend
objection to any claim or may extend
the objection .... For good cause, the
filing an action or proceeding
time 2for
1
filed.
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the time for filing an
the time for serving
court may extend the
after the objection is

The built-in "good cause" exception in section 733.705 is to be contrasted with the nonclaim statute, section 733.702, which controls the
initial filing of the claim. Any similar variation of that procedure is
outside the scope of statutory language. Thus, relief from its time bar
must be analyzed.
II.

WAIVER: THE HISTORICAL BASIS

Waiver of the filing provisions of Florida Statutes, section 733.702
is explicitly prohibited. Section 733.702(1)(a) indicates that a claim will
not be binding on the estate, the personal representative, or any
beneficiary, unless presented within three months after the first publication of the notice of administration "even though the personal representative has recognized the claim or demand by paying a part of
it, or interest on it or otherwise."''
Section 733.702(1)(a) is consistent with the probate law existing
before the January 1, 1976 effective date of the Florida Probate Code.
Former section 733.16 also indicated that any claim not filed within
the required period was void even though the personal representative
had recognized the claim by paying a portion of it.23 In fact, the
nonwaiver position is consistent with Florida probate law from the
1933 revision to the present.?

with another court decision, Golden v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 481 So. 2d 16 (1st D.C.A. 1985),
review denied, 492 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1986). Thus, the Florida Supreme Court might consider
the constitutionality of this provision. Two other decisions could have determined the constitutionality issue but were decided on other grounds. See In re Estate of Hammer, 511 So. 2d 708
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987); Ricciardelli v. Faske, 505 So. 2d 487 (3d D.C.A.), review denied, 515
So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1987). The issue has become moot since the filing of written notice requirement
was eliminated from this statute in 1988 with respect to decedents dying after July 1, 1988.
20. FLA. STAT. § 733.705(3) (Supp. 1988).
21. Id. § 733.705(3), (4).
22. Id. § 733.702(1)(a).
23. FLA. STAT. § 733.16(1) (1973).
24. Prior to the passage of the Florida Probate Code, the last major revision of Florida's
probate laws occurred in 1933. The 1933 revision became part of the Florida Statutes in 1941.
The law prior to passage of the 1933 Probate Law recognized waiver as a defense to improper
filing of a claim.
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The leading case of State Bank of Orlando & Trust Co. v. Macy
may best exemplify the status of the probate law before 1933. In
Macy, secured creditors to whom the decedent had given a note and
mortgage failed to file their claim in the office of the county judge
within twelve months of the first publication of notice to creditors as
required by the 1925 statutes. 26 Section 2 of the pertinent legislation
stated:
No claims or demands shall be valid or binding upon an
estate, or the executor or administrator thereof, unless the
same shall be duly sworn to and presented to the County
Judge of the county granting letters testamentary or of administration on an estate, at his office in the Court House
of said county; and any claims or demands not so presented
within twelve months from the time of the first publication
of the notice provided for in Section 1 hereof, shall be barred
by limitation.L
Based upon this provision, the administrator of the decedent's estate
argued that the claim was barred.2 Barring the claim would extinguish
the recorded mortgage, which legislation provided was a specific lien
valid for twenty years, simply by the mere failure to present the claim
to the county judge instead of the administrator, as required before
1925. The decedent in Macy died in 1926. The legislation had been in
force only a few months before the publication of notice to creditors.2
During estate administration, the administrator sent the creditor a
blank affidavit of claim with instructions as to how to execute and
return it.30 The creditor went personally to the administrator regarding
this debt. The administrator refused to pay the debt since it was not
yet due and thus the mortgage should be left as a lien against the
property until the note was paid. 31 The administrator paid some annual
interest until the mortgage and note became due.'2 The creditor then
attempted to determine if the note would be paid when due, but
allowed it to be renewed by accepting additional interest. 3 The wife

25.

101 Fla. 140, 133 So. 876 (1931).

26. Id.
27.

1925 Fla. Laws, ch. 101119, § 2.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Macy, 101 Fla. at 144, 133 So. at 878.
Id. at 145, 133 So. at 878.
Id. at 143, 133 So. at 878.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of the decedent then elected dower in the property and an allotment
was made consisting, in part, of the mortgaged property.3 She stated
she was unable to pay the mortgage at that time but would keep the
property insured and continue to pay the interest and taxes.3 When
the next semiannual interest payment came due, her attorney advised
her not to pay it3 6 because the estate would do soY The administrator
then advised the creditor that the estate could pay the interest, but
that they should see the county judge8 to foreclose the mortgage.3 9
However, the nonclaim statute constituted a bar. If the statute applied
to the debt, then the creditors could not foreclose the mortgage since
it was merely security for the debt, and not a timely claim.
The Florida Supreme Court, in deciding Macy, considered cases
construing the nonclaim statute from 1828 to the operative date of
the 1925 legislation. 4 0 Waiver was the critical issue in Macy since the
creditors brought the debt to the personal attention of the administrator. The administrator and the decedent's wife regularly paid interest until the due date of the principal, when the mortgage was
extended at the request of the administrator. A second issue was
whether a mortgage of record which does not fall due within the
statutory period of one year from the date of the first publication of
notice to creditors was to be considered a "claim" or "demand" necessitating the filing of a sworn statement with the county judge. 41 The
court pointed out that a recorded mortgage is generally considered
constructive notice to all creditors and purchasers.Y A mortgagee cannot demand payment of a mortgage obligation until it becomes due
as long as it is being properly paid. Nor does an obligation become a
claim or demand until due. 3
In Fremd v. Hogg" it was held under the nonclaim statute that
the mortgage claim should have been presented within the statutory
period. In Fremd, however, a mortgage of a three year term had
been given and no interest was paid by maturity, and the claim was

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 144, 133 So. at 878.
Id. at 146-47, 133 So. at 879.
Id. at 145, 133 So. at 878.
Id. at 145, 133 So. at 879.
Id.
68 Fla. 331, 67 So. 75 (1914).
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never presented. 45 No foreclosure took place and the mortgagee died

five years later. The mortgage was therefore a "claim" or "demand"
due prior to death. 4r Thus, no facts existed to support a claim of waiver.
Fremd relied upon the earlier case of Bush v. Adams. 47 The Bush
case stated, in part:
When by law lands are assets of an estate, and the mortgagor
dies without having disposed of the parcel mortgaged, and
it is part of his estate, the statute of nonclaim, as usually
framed, is as applicable in the requirements to the preservation of the lien of the mortgage against the parcel of land
as it is to the preservation of the claim against the general
assets in case the mortgage security should prove inadequate
...
. The statute applies to all "debts and demands of
whatever nature against the estate of any testator or intestate," and the notice is to all "creditors .

. . ."

Real estate, at the time of the Bush and Fremd cases, was an asset
of the estate, as it is today, with the exception of homestead. 49 These
cases held that a mortgage claim was a claim or demand against the
estate within the nonclaim statute. Failure to present the claim did
not merely postpone its payment until presented, but destroyed it.
There was no statute similar to present Florida Statutes, section
733.702(4)(a) which provides that failure to present a claim does not
affect or prevent a proceeding to enforce any mortgage, security interest, or other lien on the property of the decedent. 50 Thus, secured
creditors desiring to rely solely on the security, namely, the mortgage

45. Macy, 101 Fla. at 145, 133 So. at 879.
46. T. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 698 states:
Claims may be classified according to time of becoming due into four groups: (1)
those that were due at or before decedent's death; (2) claims which become due
after the decedent's death but during the nonclaim period; (3) obligations which
do not mature until after the nonclaim period has expired but which will become
payable thereafter; (4) claims concerning which it cannot be ascertained whether
they will ever become due. The first class and probably the second are called
matured obligations, the third class are denominated unmatured, and the fourth,
contingent claims.
Id.
47. 22 Fla. 177 (1886). See also Bush v. Adams, 25 Fla. 809, 6 So. 860 (1889).
48. 22 Fla. at 189-90.
49. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 733.607 (1987) (except as otherwise provided, every personal representative has the right to and shall take possession of the decedents property except homestead).
50. FLA. STAT. § 733.702(4)(a) (Supp. 1988).
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on real estate owned by the decedent, need not file a claim. Creditors
do not, however, generally receive deficiency judgments when the
value of the land is less than the amount due on the note.
In its analysis of a very early case, 51 the court in Macy emphasized
that the claim must be presented to the proper party in sufficient
form to give notice of the debt. 52 Affirmative action on the part of the
creditor was also required. One court has stated, "Mere knowledge
on the part of the executor or administrator of the existence of the
claim is not enough. The party holding the claim or demand must
pursue some measures to present his demand, and not remain passive,
or sleep upon his right."3 At that time, and until the Florida Probate
Code, a lawsuit was a permitted alternative to filing a claim and the
court would have accepted that as a sufficient notice to the personal
representative.
Miller v. Crosby,6 decided the same day as Fremd, involved a suit
against the administrator and heirs of mortgaged property, to enforce
a mortgage lien upon real estate.5 The mortgagee died more than ten
years before the action.- The law then in effect indicated that all
creditors of the mortgagee's estate were barred by statute after the
lapse of ten years from the mortgagee's death when no letters of
administration on his estate had issued. 57 An assignment of the
mortgage was made to the complainant by a prior assignee of the
decedent's heirs, and interest payments were made both before and
after administration began in 1907.- Interest payments were made
from 1891 to 1910. The demurrer was disallowed since the personal
representative knew of the existence of the claim, and it was recognized by the successors in interest to the original mortgagor through
the payment of interest. 59 The administrator knew that the interest
was paid to the creditor. While payment of interest does not constitute
express recognition of the claim, it does constitute waiver.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Fiyau v. Laverty, 3 Fla. 72 (1850).
101 Fla. at 149, 133 So. at 879.
Fillyau, 3 Fla. at 106.
68 Fla. 365, 67 So. 76 (1914).
Id. at 366, 67 So. at 76.
Id.
FLA. GEN. STAT. § 1715 (1906). Cf. FLA. STAT. 733.702(1)(b) (Supp. 1988) (claims are

not binding unless filed within three years after the decedent's death, if notice of administration
has not been published). Notice of administration will certainly not be published if estate administration does not occur. Id.
58. Miller, 68 Fla. at 367, 67 So. at 77.
59. Id.
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While the appeal was being perfected in Macy, a similar case,
Tucker v. First National Bank6o was decided. The Tucker case was
a proceeding to enforce a mortgage lien against real estate. Partial
payments of principal and payments of interest were made after the
mortgagor's death.6 1 No proof of claim was filed by the mortgagee's
assignee within the twelve month nonclaim period.6 The issue was
whether or not the administrator's interest payment during the twelve
months in which the claim should have been filed was sufficient to
keep the lien of the mortgage alive.63 Was such conduct a waiver of
the nonclaim period? The court explicitly held that "[the] payment by
the executor of interest on the testator's mortgage debt within the
time required for presentation of claims or demands against the estate
of the decedent, amounted to a waiver by the executor of formal
presentation of the mortgage claim."6
Legislation in 1927 added a proviso to the nonclaim statute. It
stated, in part:
Provided, however that the lien of a duly recorded mortgage
of real property and the right to foreclose same shall not be
impaired or affected by failure to present same as
hereinabove provided but that the limitation imposed by this
law shall merely bar the right of enforcement of personal
liability against the estate of the decedent.6
The statute which provides a twenty year limitation for bringing suits
upon instruments under seal allows instruments such as mortgages to
be exempt from the nonclaim statute since it simply mentions "claims"
and "demands." The note which the mortgage secures, however, is
barred.
With respect to both Tucker and Macy, the law changed after the
death of the mortgagor and prior to the due date of the mortgage.
The court in Macy considered whether a recorded mortgage was a
"claim" or "demand" under the 1925 act although not due until after
the 1927 legislation was effective.6 If so, it would be barred.6 The

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

98 Fla. 914, 124 So. 464 (1929).
Id. at 915, 124 So. at 464.
Id. at 916, 124 So. at 465.

67.

See supra note 43.

Id.
Id. at 920, 124 So. at 466.
FLA. Comp. GEN. LAWS § 5599 (1927).
See supra note 41.
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Macy court held the mortgage was not a claim or demand. While the
Tucker court was aware of the legislative changes, it based its decision
on waiver.
Macy also focused on the administrator's conduct in causing the
failure of a claimant to file claims within the nonclaim period. While
citing authority that waiver should not take place; that even fraud
upon the part of the personal representative does not excuse a failure
to fie within the nonclaim period, it recognized that in some states a
more liberal view exists and that such a view was followed in Tucker
and accepted by the court. The decedent's successor personally agreed
to pay interest and waiver occurred. The court further mentioned that
the administrator was estopped from setting up the nonclaim statute.
The administrator evidently was unaware that the 1925 legislation had
just become effective since the administrator requested the complainants make formal claim to him rather than filing with the county
judge. Such misleading conduct would be negligence, however, not
fraud. Waiver seems the appropriate justification in Macy if Tucker
is the authority.
Other early cases have also held that payment of interest amounts
to a waiver of presentation. However, Jefferson StandardLife Insurance Co. v. Estate of Jose Levera6 may have tightened the criteria
for waiver. In this case the court held that when the personal representative paid mortgage interest during the nonclaim period, the payment was insufficient to constitute waiver. 69 The court found such an

interest payment was consistent with the recognition of the mortgage
as an enforceable lien and did not waive the nonclaim period. 70 A
deficiency judgement could not take place.
In 1939, the Florida Supreme Court synthesized the waiver issue
in Marshall Lodge No. 39, A. F. & A. M. v. Woodson.71 The court
considered whether the claim presented to the personal representative,
who accepted it as a valid claim, was sufficient without filing with the
county judge. 72 The court stated the presentation could be valid if the
evidence clearly showed that the interest payment on the mortgage
debt had been in recognition of the validity of the debt as a whole.
If, on the other hand, the interest payment was made to defer fore-

68.
69.
70.

125 Fla. 682, 171 So. 512 (1936).
Id. at 683, 171 So. at 512.
Id.

71. 139 Fla. 579, 190 So. 749 (1939).
72. Id. at 586, 190 So. at 752.
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closure proceedings, the payment would not be sufficient. Substance
in terms of the evidence controls over form. If the payment of interest
were in accord with the former approach it might have dispensed with
a presentation of the mortgage claim within the statutory period. As
a consequence "any deficiency which the court might have decreed,
after applying the proceeds of the foreclosure sale of the property to
the debt, would have been upheld, in spite of the fact that no claim
had been filed in the county judge's court ....
73

III.

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PROBATE CODE:
REFINING THE CONCEPT

At this point it becomes necessary to examine the effect of a failure
to present a claim within the nonclaim time frame after the 1933
Probate Act. This legislation, with modifications and limited variation,
was in effect until the Florida Probate Code became operative in 1976.
Waiver is to be considered from the standpoint of several cases.
The personal representative cannot waive the statutory requirements for filing a claim. 74 The earliest precedent on waiver under the
1933 Act is In re Woods' Estate.7 5 When the decedent died, administration commenced promptly and creditors were notified. A creditor
filed his claim eleven months later on a debt evidenced by a promissory
note.7 6 At the time of death an eight month statute of limitations
controlled.7 7The creditor attacked the constitutionality of this statute. 78
The promissory note became due in 1926, death occurred in 1934, and
the legislation in issue was the 1933 Probate Act.7 9 The nonclaim time
period applicable, when the note became due, provided for a twelve
month period.,* Thus, the time in which the creditor could file his
claim was reduced by four months, from twelve to eight months. The
Florida Constitution, article 3, section 33 provided: "No statute shall
be passed lessening the time within which a civil action may be commenced on any cause of action existing at the time of its passage.""'

73. Id. at 595, 190 So. at 755.
74. See, e.g., In re Williamson's Estate, 95 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1956). See also Van Sciver
v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 88 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1956); American Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 151
Fla. 151, 9 So. 2d 355 (1942).
75. 133 Fla. 730, 183 So. 10 (1938).
76. Id. at 733, 183 So. at 11.
77. Id. at 733-34, 183 So. at 11-12.
78. Id. at 732-33, 183 So. at 11-12.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 734, 183 So. at 12.
81. FLA. CONST. art. 3, § 33 (1885).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[VCol.
40

The creditor relied upon this portion of the Florida Constitution in
his attack and argued for a liberal application of the provision. The
court, however, responded that there was a difference between general
statutes of limitations and special nonclaim limitations, which require
claims to be presented against the decedent's estate., The court noted
that general statutes of limitations run from the time the cause of
action arises, while nonclaim statutes apply only after appointment of
the administrator, after issuance of letters of administration, and creditor notice. The court also stated that nonclaim statutes expedite
estate settlement and the court cannot create exceptions. Otherwise,
estate settlements would be greatly delayed, causing hardship on heirs
and beneficiaries. 5
The court concluded that the constitutional provision applied to
general statutes of limitations and not the nonclaim statute. The legislation in effect at the time of the decedent's death controlled. The
right of the creditor is substantive in nature.8 6 While a general statute
of limitations would begin to run when the cause of action arose, the
nonclaim statute cannot run until the debtor dies, the estate opens,
and the personal representative begins to act. Nor did the nonclaim
statute violate the United States Constitution by impairing a contractual obligation.8
The court's attitude regarding "waiver" from the 1933 Probate Act
until the 1975 Florida Probate Code is best demonstrated in Twomey
v. Clausohm,s decided by the Florida Supreme Court in 1970. In
Twomey, the administratrix paid the funeral expenses, and small bills
for utilities, and earned insurance premiums, although none of the
claims was filed within the nonclaim period. 9 After the nonclaim period
expired, the administratrix paid for a bronze grave marker.9 The
administrator ad litem of an infant heir questioned these payments
when approval of the final accounting was sought. 91
82.

133 Fla. at 734, 183 So. at 12.

83.

Id.

84.
85.

Id. (citing Brooks v. Federal Land Bank, 106 Fla. 412, 422, 143 So. 749, 753 (1932)).
Id.

See FLA. STAT. § 731.011 (1987) which provides:
The Florida Probate Code shall become effective on January 1, 1976. The substantive rights of all persons that have vested prior to January 1, 1976, shall be
determined as provided in former chapters 731-737 and chapters 744-746 as they
exist prior to January 1, 1976. The procedures for the enforcement of substantive
rights that have vested before January 1, 1976, shall be as provided in this code.
87. In re Woods' Estate, 133 Fla. at 738, 183 So. at 14.
88. 234 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1970).
89. Id. at 339.
86.

90.
91.

Id.
Id.
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At the time of Twomey, funeral bill claims had to be filed the same
as any other claim, and the grave marker expense was within the
scope of a funeral bill.9 Although all claims were apparently nonfraudulent, the administratrix was personally liable for their payment.93
The Twomey court synthesized the law regarding waiver and distinguished cases decided before the 1933 law. Before 1933 the statutes
did not specifically exclude waiver by the personal representative.4
The court also emphasized that in 1961 the legislature inserted statutory language that an unfied claim was void "even though the personal
representative has recognized such claim or demand by paying a portion thereof or interest thereon or otherwise," 5 and that such legislation controlled the instant case.9 The legislation required "that all
claims be filed in the court and filing cannot be waived by the personal
representative. ' , The court stated it did not have judicial authority
to ignore this mandate.
Twomey, although prior in time to the Florida Probate Code, essentially describes the law as it exists today. No claim or demand
against a decedent's estate that arose before death binds an estate
unless presented within three months after the first publication of the
notice of adminstration, "even though the personal representative has
recognized the claim or demand by paying a part of it or interest on
it or otherwise."98 There are statutory exceptions to the prohibition
against waiver of the requirement that the claim or demand be properly filed. A personal representative may settle in full any claim without the claim being filed if the beneficiaries adversely affected have
approved and the settlement is made within the three month nonclaim

92. Id. at 340. Subsequent to the fact situation in Twomey, legislation became effective which provided that funeral expenses up to a specified amount could be paid without
filing a claim. This legislation was in effect from 1967 to 1981. See In re Estate of Williams,
381 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 2d D.O.A. 1980). Today funeral and burial expenses incurred after
the decedent's death must be filed and are specifically barred by the nonclaim statute if
filed more than three months from the time of the first publication of the notice of
administration. FLA. STAT. § 733.702(1)(a) (Supp. 1988).
93. 234 So. 2d at 341.
94. Id. at 340.
95. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 733.16(1) (1967).
96. 234 So. 2d at 340.
97. Id.
98. See FLA. STAT. § 733.702(1)(a) (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added). Included within
the scope of the term "claim" is any claim of the state or its subdivisions; any claim for
funeral or burial expenses; any claim for personal property in the possession of the
personal representative; and any claim for damages for compensable loss attributed to
the decedent. Id.
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period.9 Alternatively, the personal representative may file a proof

of claim of all claims that have been paid or are intended to be paid.00
Finally, fraud or estoppel may also justify recognition of untimely
claims.
IV.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESTOPPEL EXCEPTION

While waiver of the nonclaim time period has long been an issue,
a second concept, estoppel, has been uniformly applied as an exception.
The elements of estoppel are: (1) a representation of a material fact,
which is contrary to a later assertion by the estopped party; (2) reliance
upon the representation by the party claiming estoppel; and (3) a
detrimental change in position in reliance on the representation by
the party claiming the estoppel. 101 While estoppel can result from a
verbal statement it may also be caused by conduct. 1' 2
While early cases mentioned estoppel in the nonclaim area, the
first express holding is Adams v. Hackensack Trust Co.' °3 In Adams,
the decedent, Joseph Adams, had state contacts in New York, New
Jersey, and Florida.' ° Estate administration began in Florida and an
executor was appointed. 0 5 The plaintiff, the Hackensack Trust Co.,
attempted to gain information about this particular estate. 1°6 In early
1941 when the debtor failed to pay interest, the bank sent two separate
letters to his home in Brooklyn, New York. 107 After receiving no reply,
the bank called the debtor's son. The son informed the bank that the
debtor had died and that all inquiries should be made to a brother,
Ray Adams, in Miami Beach, Florida. °a The bank wrote to Ray Adams
and attempted to find out where a will was probated, °9 but it received
no reply. 110 When the bank learned that Ray Adams was an executor
of Joseph Adams' estate, another letter was written."' Adams did not

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Davis v. Evans, 132 So. 2d 476, 481 (1st D.C.A.), cert. denied, 136 So. 2d
348 (Fla. 1961).
102. Id.
103. 156 Fla. 20, 22 So. 2d 392 (1945).
104. Id. at 22, 22 So. 2d at 393.
105. Id. at 21, 22 So. 2d at 392.
106. Id. at 22, 22 So. 2d at 393.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 23, 22 So. 2d at 393.
111. Id.
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reply, but Zimmerman, a New York City attorney responded."1 A
representative of the bank discussed its claim with Zimmerman and
the latter "assured plaintiff that the proceeds of any sale of the
mortgaged property would be allowed as a credit on plaintiffs claim
and that the estate would take care of whatever balance there might
Zimmerman received proof of a
be after such credit was allowed.'
claim conforming to New York and New Jersey law since "plaintiff
[knew] that the deceased had a home in New Jersey and also one in
New York and [had] learned that Joseph H. Adams died in his Brooklyn home, plaintiff was justified in concluding that the estate was
being administered in one or the other of those states. '' 4 The proof
of claim was in fact sent to Ray Adams, one of the executors, who
in turn sent it to Zimmerman." 5
However, the will was actually probated in Florida. Proper publication was made and the nonclaim period expired without the claim
being filed in the Florida probate court. 6 Thus by statute the claim
was barred. When the bank learned of the probate proceedings from
a Miami attorney, it quickly filed a claim in Florida." 7 The probate
court accepted the claim and it was upheld on appeal.1 8 The court
determined that the defendants
[b]y withholding information as to the place of probate of
said will and assuring plaintiff that its claim would be paid,
have waived the statute of non-claim and are [now] estopped
to question the failure of plaintiff to file its claim in the office
of the County Judge for Dade County, Florida, within the
statutory period .... 1
Despite the use of the term waiver, the result is based on estoppel.
The personal representative's actions showed more than a mere recognition of the bank's claim:
One of the executors having advised claimant that deceased
died in his home in New York, he was then under the duty
to advise claimant that theretofore deceased had established

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 23-24, 22 So. 2d at 393.
at 24, 22 So. 2d at 394.
at 26, 22 So. 2d at 394.

at 27, 22 So. 2d at 395.
at 26-27, 22 So. 2d at 395.
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his residence in Florida and that the will was probated not
in New York, where deceased died, and not in New Jersey,
where he resided when the mortgage was executed, but in
Florida. In withholding information which was contrary a
logical deduction to be drawn from the information given, a
fraud was committed which was calculated to mislead, and
which did result in misleading, the claimant. It was the perpetuation of this fraud and misconduct which opened the
portals of a court of equity for the granting of the relief
sought. By so doing, the executors are barred in equity from
pleading the statute.20
Thus, the personal representative was barred from pleading the
nonclaim statute because his fraud or misconduct caused the claimant
not to ifie within the permitted time frame. 21 Affirmative conduct, or
inaction to conduct of others, beyond simply recognizing the claim is
required for estoppel to arise. In Adams, deceit, misrepresentation
and fraud lulled the claimant into a false sense of security. The claimant
through Ray Adams, the executor, and the attorney Zimmerman,
believed that the proof of claim was properly filed and that it would
in due course be paid.The next case to consider the estoppel argument was Davis v.
Evans,m in which a negligence action was brought against the deceased, Anderson Willie Phillips. m In fact the real name of the decedent was Anderson Woody Phillips.m When Phillips died, his attorney
sent interrogatories without mentioning the defendant's death.1-6 Additional pleadings took place.m7 During this time, the decedent's
executor knew about the litigation but failed to file a suggestion of
death or inform the plaintiff that Phillips had died. m After the nonclaim
period expired, suggestion of death was filed in the tort action 'in
which for the first time defendant's proper name was stated as 'Anderson Woody Phillips' and his death reported."'' 9 An attempt was made
to substitute the executor of the estate and a defense was presented

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 28-29, 22 So. 2d at 396.
Id.
Id. at 23-24, 22 So. 2d at 393.
132 So. 2d 476 (1st D.C.A.), cert. denied, 136 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1961).

124. Id. at 478.
125.

Id. at 479.

126. Id.
127.

Id.

128.

Id.

129.

Id.
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by way of the nonclaim time bar. 130 The issue was whether acts of
omission or commission performed on behalf of Phillips, or the executor
of his estate, estopped the executor from asserting the nonclaim bar. 13 1
Commencement of the lawsuit within the nonclaim time period
132
through substitution of parties would have been acceptable.
The court held the personal representative was estopped from asserting nonclaim as a bar. 133 A personal representative with knowledge
of pre-death litigation has a duty to prevent an adverse party in the
litigation "from being lulled into a false sense of security as reasonably
might result by the continued filing therein of pleadings which fairly
raise the inference that the original party defendant, the deceased, is
correctly named and remains alive."' 14 In the instant case the personal
representative had a duty to speak, and failure to do so resulted in
estoppel based on the maxim, "One who is silent when he ought to
speak will not be heard to speak when he ought to be silent."' Estoppel occurred because of silence "when common honesty and fair dealing
demanded that a person estopped should have spoken. ''" 36 The court
remanded the case to determine if estoppel existed on the facts. 137 No
mention of waiver took place, but the court referred to Adams and
noted that estoppel is an affirmative defense which is waived unless
specifically pleaded. 33 Clearly at this point estoppel constitutes an
excuse for the failure to file in a timely manner.
Estoppel as an excuse was reaffirmed in North v. Culmer,139 which
could be called the "Case of the Vanishing Insurance Adjuster." The
North court questioned whether the actions of an automobile liability
insurance company in negotiating a settlement with an injured person's
attorney may give rise to estoppel under the nonclaim statute. 140 The
plaintiff suffered personal injury and property damage because of the
defendant's conduct. 14' The defendant reported the case to an insurance

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
Corp. v.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 481.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 482-83.
193 So. 2d 701 (4th D.C.A. 1967), overruled on other grounds, Rinker Materials
Palmer First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 361 So. 2d 156, 159 (Fla. 1978).
193 So. 2d at 702.
Id. at 703.
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agent who referred it to an insurance company.'4 A claims representative then contacted plaintiffs attorney to negotiate a settlement143
Initial contact took place in September 1961.'4 Negotiations continued
until July 1963 when a new adjuster, unfamiliar with the file, was
assigned to the case. 145 Plaintiffs attorney indicated that he was led
to believe the plaintiffs claims could be concluded without filing a
suit.146 No suit was filed and a short time later another claims representative was assigned to the case. 47 This adjuster also was unfamiliar
with the file. 14 He was followed by a fourth and fifth insurance adjuster.149 Finally, a representative of the insurance company informed
plaintiffs attorney that the adjuster would be able to negotiate a
settlement within three weeks.15
In March 1964 plaintiff filed an action for damagess1i and was informed that the insured had died in June 1963 and notice to creditors
was first published in July 1963. The six month nonclaim period had
thus run.162
The court stated the requirements of the nonclaim statute must
be strictly construed. However, if the doctrine of estoppel were applicable an exception would be present. The court noted that estoppel
was a doctrine entrenched in Florida law. The issue was whether the
insurance company's conduct estopped the personal representative
from asserting the time bar. The court found the personal representative was estopped.
The personal representative admitted the insurance company was
the decedent's liability insurance carrier, and was authorized to
negotiate a settlement. Moreover, the personal representative was
aware of the company's actions. Inducing the plaintiff to reasonably
believe that the claim would be settled and continuing after the expiration of the nonclaim time period constituted estoppel. Adams v.

142.

Id.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Hackensack Trust Co. 1's and Davis v. Evans'54 were cited as authority.
North took a broad view of conduct that would result in estoppel. It
stated:
[Aictual fraud in the technical sense, bad faith, or an intent
to mislead or deceive is not essential to create such an estoppel.
It is enough if the conduct claimed as a basis for the
estoppel is done with actual or virtual intent that the other
party should act upon it. 1
In contrast to North, an extension to file the claim was not granted
in Stanton v. Kruse,'5 which involved a suit to recover damages from
the estate of a motorist who died in an automobile accident with the
plaintiff. 57 Decedent was insured and the issue was whether the insurance company would pay damages.15 The plaintiffs attorney was in
contact with the insurance company's attorney. Negotiations took place
and both lawyers decided not to file a lawsuit."59 The insured then
6
died.60 The plaintiff and his attorney were informed of the death.1 '
The decedent's personal representative published a notice to creditors.' , Finally, a claim for damages was filed, but after the six
month nonclaim period's' the personal representative declined to honor
the claim and the plaintiff asserted estoppel.'>
The court considered that the attorney who negotiated with the
insurance company had represented the insured in his individual capacity and did not represent the personal representative.16 Thus, the
insurer was not in privity with the personal representative. More
importantly, the insured "was at all times apprised of Woolf's death,
and had actual notice of the publication of the estate's notice to creditors." 1' Neither the personal representative nor the attorney led

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

156 Fla. 20, 22 So. 2d 392 (1945).
132 So. 2d 476 (1st D.C.A.), cert. denied, 136 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1961).
North, 193 So. 2d at 704.
229 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1970).
Id. at 657.
Id. at 658.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the claimant to disregard the nonclaim statute. 16 7 Nor was there any
evidence that the death was not disclosed. 1' The facts simply did not
give rise to estoppel, as in Adams, Davis, and North.
At the time of the enactment of the Florida Probate Code, estoppel
was a well recognized exception to the nonclaim statute. Whether
estoppel existed was determined on a case-by-case basis.
V.

THE FLORIDA PROBATE CODE: WAIVER AND
ESTOPPEL, 1976-1986

The Florida Probate Code contains a rather extensive nonclaim
statute, Florida Statutes, section 733.702. [See Appendix I]. The
nonclaim period is now three months after the first publication of the
notice of administration, which operates as a notice to creditors. The
present legislation requires the filing of creditors' claims for obligations
that arise before death, and for funeral or burial expenses if the estate
is liable. This area of the law has been unsettled. In Twomey v.
Clausohm, claims for funeral bills had to be ffled. 16 9 With legislation
enacted in 1967, funeral expenses up to $750 could be paid without
filing a claim.17° The Florida Probate Code initially contained no lan1 71
guage addressing funeral expenses and In re Estate of Williams
held that they need not be filed. "2 Florida Statutes, section 733.702(1),
then provided that no pre death claim against a decedent was binding
1
on the estate unless filed within the three month nonclaim period. 7
Florida Statutes, section 731.204(4) defines claims to include funeral
expenses.174 Since claims for funeral expenses usually occur after death,
the statute was held not to apply to post-death claims. An amendment
to section 733.702(1)(a) effective October 1, 1981, requires filing funeral
or burial expenses incurred subsequent to the death of the decedent.
Such expenses are specifically barred by the nonclaim statute if they
are filed more than three months after the time of the first publication
of the notice of administration.175

167. Id.

168. Id.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
changed
175.

234 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1970).
See FLA. STAT. §§ 733.16(2), 733.20(1)(b) (1967).
381 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980).
Id. at 736.
FLA. STAT. § 733.702(1)(a) (1977).
FLA. STAT. § 731.201(4) (Supp. 1988). This part of the definitions section has not
since the Florida Probate Code became effective on January 1, 1976.
Id. § 733.702(1)(a).
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A possible problem is presented by the language in Florida Statutes, section 733.702(1) that reads "no claim for personal property in
the possession of the personal representative.., is binding .... 176
'Personal property in the possession of the personal representative"
means assets of the decedent held by the personal representative that
are claimed by others. 1' Despite the broad language of the statute,
the law will probably not change. Prior law did not require a person
claiming ownership to specific property held by a personal representative to file a claim. 178 Exclusion from the filing requirement is attributable to the theory that the property never became part of the estate
79
because it was held in trust by the decedent at the time of death.
Florida courts held that a replevin action against an estate is not
generally barred by failure to comply with the nonclaim statute.8 4 A
replevin action depends upon superiority of the title or right of possession of the complaining party over the decedent or the estate. Replevin
asserts a claim on identifiable property and alleges it is not part of
the decedent's estate. For this reason, the person bringing the action
is not a claimant under the nonclaim statute. Florida case law has
provided an exception to the requirements of section 733.702 and predecessor legislation. The exception is known as the 'trust exception,"
the "equitable title or beneficial ownership exception," or the "specifically identifiable property exception."''
Florida courts have consistently held that an action to enforce a
trust under which the decedent held property for the benefit of another
is not subject to the nonclaim statute. 1' The trust was permitted as
an exception because the trust property is not considered an asset of
the decedent's estate.8 4 The property does not become part of the
estate because it was held in trust by the decedent at the time of
death. 84 The 'trust exception" arises when the decedent holds bare
legal title to the property at the time of death, and the equitable title

176. Id.
177. See In re Estate of Kulow, 439 So. 2d 280, 282 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983).
178. See Hodges v. Logan, 82 So. 2d 885, 887-88 (Fla. 1955); Fisher v. Creamer, 332 So.
2d 50, 51-52 (3d D.C.A.), cert. dismissed, 336 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1976).
179. 82 So. 2d at 888; 332 So. 2d at 51-52.
180. See Zeidel v. Estate of Rosenberg, 357 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla.3d D.C.A. 1978).
181. See Velzy v. Estate of Miller, 502 So. 2d 1297, 1299 (Fla.2d D.C.A. 1987).
182. See Beke v. Molnar's Estate, 82 So. 2d 595, 596 (Fla. 1955); Cooey v. Cooey, 132 Fla.
716, 723, 182 So. 202, 204-05 (1938).
183. See Sewell v. Sewell Properties, 30 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 1947); Fisher v. Creamer,
332 So. 2d 50, 51-52 (3d D.C.A.), cert. dismissed, 336 So. 2d 600 (Fla.1976).
184. See Steigman v. Danese, 502 So. 2d 463, 469 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1987).
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or beneficial ownership have vested in another who claims the property
adverse to the estate. 1w Relief is granted when the property can be
1
traced to the personal representative or another person. i
In 1987, however, the 'trust exception" was questioned in Velzy
v. Estate of Miller.5 7 Velzy narrowed the application of the exception
based on a comparison of the provisions of the present and former

Florida Statutes. The court found former Florida Statutes, section
733.19 exempted claims to specific property while section 733.706 did
not. 188 The court stated, "It seems now that the clearly expressed
legislative intent is to bar all claims that arose before the death of
the decedent that are not filed as required by section 733.702."' It
limited or qualified the exceptions to situations in which the decedent
clearly held the property on behalf of the actual owner, through an
express trust or other defined means.' 9°
The court stated their decision comported with the legislative intent
of section 733.702(2), which states, "No cause of action . . . shall
survive the death of the person against whom the claim may be made
... unless the claim is filed in the manner provided in this part and

within the time limited."' 9 The Velzy court believed it was stating

185. See In re Estate of Peterson, 433 So. 2d 1358, 1359 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
186. See Staley v. Jackson, 154 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1963). When the trust
property cannot be traced, the beneficial owner has only the remedy of a general creditor of
the estate. Id. See Cooey v. Cooey, 132 Fla. 716, 723, 182 So. 202, 204-05 (1938). Thus such a
general creditor must unquestionably file a claim within the time provided by FLA. STAT. §
733.702(1)(a) (Supp. 1988).
187. 502 So. 2d 1297, 1299-300 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987). This is a companion case to Velzy
v. Estate of Miller, 502 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987).
188. Compare FLA. STAT. § 733.706 (1987) which provides:
Except upon approval by the court, no execution or other process shall issue on
or be levied against property of the estate. Claims on all judgments against a
decedent shall be filed in the same manner as other claims against estates of
decedents. This section shall not be construed to prevent the enforcement of
mortgages, security interests, or liens encumbering specific property.
with FLA. STAT. § 733.19 (1973) which provides:
No execution shall issue upon or be levied under any judgment against a decedent
or against the personal representative, nor shall any levy be made against any
property, real or personal, of the estate of a decedent. Claims upon all judgments
against the decedent shall be filed in the same manner as other claims against
estates of decedents; provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall
not be construed to prevent the enforcement of mortgages, pledges, liens or claims
to specific property, real or personal.
Id.
189. Velzy, 502 So. 2d at 1300.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1300-01.
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the correct posture of the law. 19 No other case has made a more

exacting analysis of the problem since the Florida Probate Code became law.
Certain classes of claims, according to section 733.702(4), do not
have to be filed because they are expressly excepted from the three
month bar. Section 733.702(4)(a) states that nothing otherwise in the
statute affects or prevents "a proceeding to enforce any mortgage,
security interest, or other lien on property of the decedent."'93 Included
within this statute section are mortgages on real property and chattel
mortgages on personal property.'1' If the secured creditor is willing
to rely solely on the value of the security the claim need not be filed.195
Failure to file a claim, however, precludes the creditor from obtaining
a deficiency judgment against the decedent's estate.'9 Section
733.702(4)(b) indicates that an exception to the filing requirement
exists "to the limits of casualty insurance protection only, [for] any
proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which he is protected by the casualty insurance."'19 This
provision negates the impact of a case such as North95g or Stanton v.
Kruse.'99 The creditor need not show estoppel to reach the insurer of
the decedent. 2° However, this subsection would only give relief to the
amount of the insurance. 2° ' No recovery is available at a higher amount
without the filing of the claim.
Section 733.702(4)(c) also exempts the Department of Revenue from
the filing requirement if it files within thirty days after service of the
inventory. 202 This amendment to the statute protects the state to the
extent it desires to collect for intangible taxes that should have been
paid.'203 While the state must file a claim as any other creditor, it

192. Id. at 1300.
FLA. STAT. § 733.702(4)(a) (Supp. 1988).
194. Id. Such inclusion is implicit from the language used.
195. Id.
196. Id. Any claim in excess of the value of the security interest must comply with the
requirements of § 733.702(1)(a).
197. See id. § 733.702(4)(b).
198. 193 So. 2d 701 (4th D.C.A. 1967) (decedent's insurer induced plaintiffs attorney to
continue settlement negotiations beyond six month statutory period for filing claims; decedent's
personal representative estopped from asserting nonclaim statute as a bar to plaintiffs claims),
overruled on other grounds, Rinker Materials Corp. v. Palmer First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
361 So. 2d 156, 159 (Fla. 1978).
199. 229 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1970).
193.

200.

FLA. STAT. § 733.702(4)(b) (Supp. 1988).

201. Id.
202. Id. § 733.702(4)(c).
203. See id. § 731.111.
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would be pointless for it to file when no assets exist. Finally, section
733.702(4)(d) provides an exception to filing cross-claims or counestate, although
terclaims against estates in actions begun by2 the
4
recovery.
estate's
the
exceed
recovery may not
Critical from the standpoint of the current statute is subsection
(1)(a), which states that the claim is not binding "even though the
personal representative has recognized the claim or demand by paying
a part of it or interest on it or otherwise." 2°5 The same language was
inserted into the nonclaim statute in 1961 and interpreted in
Twomey. 2°6 The uncertainty is whether courts will treat it the same
way today.
Section 733.702(1)(a) makes two exceptions for filing creditor's
claims. First, the personal representative may settle unfiled claims if
the settlement has been approved by the beneficiaries adversely affected. 2 07 The settlement must be made during the three month

nonclaim period.m Second, the personal representative can file a proof
of claim of all claims paid or to be paid. 209 The statute does not specify
when the proof of claim must be filed, but it is logical to require that
this take place within the nonclaim period as well.
The first post-Code case addressing the issue of waiver is In re
Estate of Turner.210 In Turner, the personal representative paid hospital and doctor bills even though creditors had not filed claims within
the nonclaim period and the heirs objected to the payment. 211 Relying

upon Twomey, 2 2the court simply stated that, "The personal representative is not authorized to pay out money from an estate except in
accordance with the established statutory procedures.2 13 The court's

204. Id. § 733.702(4)(d). This subsection was enacted in 1985. Counterclaims arising out of
litigation commenced prior to the decedent's death have been held contingent claims subjected
to the three month time bar. See Lasater v. Leathers, 475 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1985)

(counterclaim asserted against defendant who subsequently died unable to be maintained against
defendant's estate in absence of any claim or demand made by counterclaimants against the

estate within three months of first publication of notice of administration); Gates Learjet Corp.
v. Moyer, 459 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1984) (limits presentation of claims applicable to

counterclaims and cross counterclaims though they did not arise until after decedent's death).
205.

FLA. STAT. § 733.702(1)(a) (Supp. 1988).

206.

234 So. 2d at 338.

207. FLA. STAT. § 733.703(1)(a) (Supp. 1988).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 357 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1978).
211. Id. at 743.
212. 234 So. 2d at 338.
213. 357 So. 2d at 743.
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reliance on Twomey, the most recent pre-Florida Probate Code case,
which itself summarized then existing attitudes towards waiver, shows
that the law on waiver has not changed, since all claims are to be
214
filed in court and the personal representative cannot waive the filing.
Estate of Turner should be read with an equally concise case, In
5
re Estate of Perlman.21
In Perlman, the court invalidated a claim
filed beyond the statutory time period.216 The court cited North for
the proposition that an untimely claim is barred unless an exception
applies.'17 The court found no exception. Since the North case is the
best example of estoppel and is not predicated on waiver, estoppel is
an accepted exception to the filing requirement under the Florida
Probate Code. Thus, Turner and Perlman show that the law as it
existed immediately prior to the passage of the Code remains intact.
The broad language as to the conduct that would constitute estoppel
in North218 has been restricted by Rinker Materialsv. Palmer First
National Bank. 21 9 Rinker stated the weight of authority was contra
to the North language that "actual fraud in the technical sense, bad
faith, or an intent to mislead or deceive is not essential to create such
an estoppel." ' 0 The Rinker court found there must be affirmative
deception before estoppel would arise.21 The court stated that, "We
hold that a party may successfully maintain a suit under the theory
of equitable estoppel only where there is proof of fraud, misrepresentation, or other affirmative deception."- With this expression of the
estoppel doctrine accepted, the court in Estate of Peterson found no
active deception.2
In HarbourHouse Properties v. Estate of Stone,2 the court considered whether a creditor proved the elements of estoppel against
the personal representative, excusing the creditor from the requirement of filing a timely claim.2 The decedent, Pearl Stone, was the

214.
215.

234 So. 2d at 340-41.
381 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979).

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. North, 193 So. 2d at 704, overruled on other grounds, Rinker Materials Corp. v.
Palmer First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 361 So. 2d 156, 159 (Fla. 1978).
219. 361 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1978).
220. Id. at 158.

221.

Id.

222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 159.
433 So. 2d 1358, 1359 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
443 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984).
Id. at 137.
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lessee of an apartment from Harbour House.2 26 She died in January,
1982 prior to the expiration of a substantial portion of the lease term.227
Estate administration began in February 1982.22 The personal representatives of the Stone estate brought monthly payments to Harbour
House, first paying back rent due and then payments of current rent.29
Before the nonclaim period expired, the personal representative and
Harbour House entered into an agreement in which Harbour House
would find a successor tenant.3 0 The agreement contained a clause
that stated, "the Landlord and Tenant agree that the Tenant still has
the right, duty and obligation both to abide by the OriginalLease and
to submit an acceptable application to the Landlord in connection with
the reletting of the Apartment."2 ' 1 As soon as the nonclaim time period
expired, the personal representative stopped paying rent. 2 The creditor then filed a claim and the personal representative filed a motion
to strike because of the late filing.2 The creditor stated "that the
personal representative had lulled him into a false sense of security
and should therefore be estopped to claim a bar under the nonclaims
statute. '" 4 The creditor relied on the reletting agreement and the
payments of rent.2 The court, citing Davis v. Evans,2 36 stated that
circumstances may exist which excuse a creditor from the apparently
absolute bar of the nonclaim statute.2 7 It also stated that Florida
Statutes, section 733.702 and its predecessors are not nonclaim statutes
but guidelines for judicial procedure which may be relaxed for good
cause at the discretion of the probate court.M On the basis of statutory
interpretation the court was in error, however, regarding good cause.
A similar approach was taken by courts construing Florida Statutes,
section 733.705, which determines the actions of the personal representative and the creditor once the claim has been filed.2 9 "Good cause,"

226. Id.
227. Id.

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 137-38.
236. 132 So. 2d 476 (1st D.C.A.), cert. denied, 136 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1961).
237. 443 So. 2d at 138.
238. Id. at 137.
239. See In re Estate of Hammer, 511 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987); Williams v. Estate
of Williams, 493 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1986); Golden v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 481 So. 2d
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however, is a built-in exception to that legislation,4 ° but is not a stated
exception to the nonclaim statute.
The Harbour House court pointed out that mere recognition or
payment of a claim by a personal representative will not excuse late
filing. Such recognition would amount to waiver and the cases decided
under the Florida Probate Code hold that waiver is not an excuse.
However, the court noted that in the reletting agreement the personal
representative recognized the lease as a viable and continuing debt
rather than a preexisting obligation. The agreement and the continued
rental payments raised the issue of estoppel. One could reasonably
argue that the personal representative's conduct had estopped him
fr-om denying presentation of the claim.
VI.

BARNETT BANK V. ESTATE OF READ AND BEYOND

In 1986, the Florida Supreme Court in Barnett Bank v. Estate of
Read241 definitely determined the nature of Florida Statutes, section
733.702.242 In Read, the decedent, Leon Henry Read, Jr., executed a
promissory note for $100,000 to Barnett Bank. 2 3 Read died on April
5, 1983, estate administration began and the notice of administration
was published on April 29.m Read's personal representative met with
officers of the bank and told the bank officers that the note would be
paid without the bank having to file a claim in the estate.2 5 The terms
of this conversation were specifically stated in a subsequent writing:
"I wish to further confirm my advices to you . . . that the estate
would recognize the proper amounts due under these notes without
the necessity of the bank filing a formal claim. 2 46 The estate, however,
failed to pay the debt and on February 17, 1984 the bank filed its

16 (1st D.C.A. 1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1986); In re Estate of Dezso, 382
So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1980); In re Estate of Oxford, 372 So. 2d 1129 (2d D.C.A. 1979),
cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1980). Cases decided under predecessor legislation support
this conclusion. See In re Estate of Sale, 227 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1969); In re Estate of Goldman,
79 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1955); In re Jeffries' Estate, 136 Fla. 410, 181 So. 833 (1938); In re Estate
of Kemp, 177 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1965).
240. FLA. STAT. § 733.705(2),(3) (Supp. 1988).
241.

493 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1986).

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 448.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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claimi. 7 The personal representative did not respond to this fling.24 1
The court found the full amount of the claim was due to the bank.2 9
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held the circuit
court had no authority to order payment because the claim was not

filed within the three month nonclaim period.2 ° The court stated the
initial validity of the claim was not a collateral matter and that the
trial court record unequivocally demonstrated the untimeliness of the
claim. 25' The record showed no evidence of estoppel and Florida Statutes, section 733.701 indicated that when notice of administration was

properly filed creditors had to "present their claims within three
months after the date of the first publication of such notice or be
forever barred." 2
The case reached the Florida Supreme Court with the issue being
whether Florida Statutes, section 733.702 was a jurisdictional statute
of nonclaim or a statute of limitations.2 If the statute were one of
nonclaim, then the untimely claim would be automatically barred. " 1
If the statute were one of limitations, the claim would only be barred
if it were raised as an affirmative defense, or if the defense appeared
on the face of the prior pleading by way of a motion to strike.2
Failure to properly plead a statute of limitations has been considered
waiver.25 While waiver is not permitted today, by the express terms
of Florida Statutes, section 733.702(1)(a), in reality, analysis of this

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. In re Estate of Read, 472 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1985).
251. Id. at 1273.
252. FLA. STAT. § 733.701 (1987).
253. 493 So. 2d at 448.
253. 493 So. 2d at 448.
254. Cf. Miller v. Nolte, 453 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1984). The question presented was whether
a taxpayer is foreclosed from contesting a tax assessment when failing to file an action within
sixty days from the date the assessment was certified for collection. The court retreated from
its characterization of FLA. STAT. § 194.171(2) (1981) as a nonclaim statute, since under this
characterization the taxpayer would be denied the right to due process. The court emphasized
the inequity in prohibiting the taxpayer from raising any valid estoppel arguments to assertions
that he failed to file the action within sixty days of certification. Id. at 401.
255. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d).
256. See Aboandandolo v. Vonella, 88 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1956) (trial court required to assume
that the New Jersey statute of limitations was the same as Florida's; Florida's statute of
limitations is waived unless pled); Tuggle v. Maddox, 60 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1952) (divorced wife's
action for damages against ex-husband for child support is not barred by statute of limitations
when the ex-husband failed to use the statute as an affirmative defense).
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legislation means that the defense of nonclaim cannot be waived without potential liability of the personal representative. 2 7 The matter will
be resolved by an ultimate surcharging of the personal representative
by the beneficiaries.
If Florida Statutes, section 733.702 were a jurisdictional statute
of nonclaim which automatically barred the bank's claim, then estoppel
and waiver would not be exceptions to the statutory time bar. Read,
however, held that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations. m A
number of cases, while using nonclaim terminology when referring to
this statute section, have treated it as a statute of limitations. 2 9 The
statute should now be considered a special type of statute of limitations. The statute should be enforced more rigorously than a normal
statute of limitations since the defense of nonclaim cannot be waived
by the terms of the statute without potential liability being incurred
by the personal representative, and since the statute runs regardless
of the minority or incompetence of the creditor.2 Read determined
that valid grounds, such as estoppel or fraud, may exist to excuse
untimely claims that would be barred if Florida Statutes, section

257. See Smith, supra note 5, at 71.
258. Accord Harbour House Properties, Inc. v. Estate of Stone, 443 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1983) (Landlord was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether acts,
representations, and conduct of decedent's personal representative and his agent lulled landlord
into a false sense of security concerning need for presentation of a claim and therefore whether
personal representative should be estopped to deny presentation of claim as untimely.); Picchione
v. Asti, 354 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978) (Summary judgment properly entered against
plaintiff who failed to file his claim pursuant to limitations statute. Since plaintiff did not reply
to estate's motion for summary judgment, the estate was estopped to assert limitations statute.);
Stern v. First Nat'l Bank, 275 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973) (Dismissal of lessee's complaint
against executor of lessors estate, which was based on lessee's failure to comply with statute
requiring claims be filed within six months of first publication of notice to creditors, was reversible
error where averment of failure was made in motion to dismiss rather than as an affirmative
defense in pleading.).
259. See, e.g., In re Estate of Peterson, 433 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983) (neither
estoppel nor trust exception to nonclaims statute preserved untimely claim filed against estate);
Grossman v. Selewacz, 417 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1982) (failure to file claim before nonclaim
time period rendered claim unenforceable); In re Estate of Gay, 294 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1974) (class claim could not be filed against estate, and allowing amendment to permit subsequent
identification of members of class was improper); North v. Culmer, 193 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1967) (personal representative was estopped from asserting nonclaim statute as a bar
to actions on claims when claims representative of decedent's insurer induced plaintiffs attorney
to continue negotiations to effect settlement of claims arising out of automobile accident beyond
six months' statutory period), overruled on other grounds, Rinker Materials Corp. v. Palmer
First Nat'l Bank, 361 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1978) (theory of equitable estoppel applies only where
there is proof of fraud, misrepresentation, or other affirmative deception).
260. See Smith, supra note 5, at 72.
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733.702 were jurisdictional in nature. 26' These exceptions are applicable
because the statute is one of limitations. 2 Thus, a creditor who fails
to file a claim will not always be barred from enforcing the claim. The
personal representative had to act affirmatively when an untimely
claim was filed. In Read, if the estate had objected to the claim at
the probate court level, it would have been remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of estoppel. 2 6 The estate, however, failed
to raise the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations.26 The
personal representative failed in his responsibility for administering
the estate.2 6 Read was recently followed. 26 The critical language of
the Read case was emphasized. This language states:
We fully recognize the strong public policy in favor of
settling and closing estates in a speedy manner. [J]ustice
requires us to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations. Valid grounds, such as estoppel or fraud, may exist
that would and should excuse untimely claims. A creditor
would lose the right to assert these potentially valid claims
were we to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of nonclaim.
Our holding that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations
confirms the fact that estates and creditors must adhere to
well established practices when dealing with untimely claims.
The estate must file a motion to strike or other objection to
an untimely claim.267
Such is not the case for estates of decedents dying after July 1,
1988 since Florida Statutes, section 732.703(3) now states, in part,
that "[a]ny claim not timely filed as provided in this section is barred
even though no objection to the claim is fied on the grounds of timeliness or otherwise unless the court extends the time in which the
claim may be filed."
2
The law developed beyond Read in Scutieri v. Estate of Revitz. 6
Scutieri created a judicial excuse for untimely filing of claims which

261.
262.

493 So. 2d 447, 449 (Fla. 1986).
Id. at 448 (court held that § 733.702 is a statute of limitations).

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See Campbell v. Estate of Schleusener, 504 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987) (where
creditors' rationale for filing late claim arose from fraud and estoppel, trial court had jurisdiction

to extend the filing period).
267. 493 So. 2d at 449.
268. 510 So. 2d 1003 (3d D.C.A. 1987), review denied, 519 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1988). See also
Schmitz, Scutieri's "Good Cause" StandardRewrites the Law for Allowance of ProbateCreditors'
Late Filed Claims, FLA. B.J. 69 (June 1988).
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goes beyond the well established exceptions of fraud and estoppel. In
Scutieri, the Third District Court of Appeal decided a probate court
could extend the time for the filing of a claim if the creditor showed
good cause for the granting of an extension. 6 9 It is important to note
that this case contains no allegations of fraud or estoppel. The court
has simply and dramatically added a "good cause" exception to Florida
Statutes, section 733.702. 0° Good cause was found because the claim
was based on a lawsuit that had been pending against the decedent
for four years at the time of death. Since the decedent's personal
representative had been promptly substituted as a party to the lawsuit
before the running of the three month time period for the filing of
claims, the personal representative had legal notice of the claim.The court determined that the personal representative
[wias legally notified of the claim against the estate in timely
fashion by virtue of her being made a party to the lawsuit
within the statutory period; she cannot now be heard to
complain that she was not legally notified of the same so as
to preclude the late-filed statement of claim. 2
This claim, though filed thirty-three days late, was acceptable because there was "no showing of prejudice" to the personal representative, the estate beneficiaries, or others.ms
The court's decision follows the reasoning in Dohnal v. Syndicated
Office Systems.- 4 However, Dohnal considered whether clerical error

269. Id. at 1004.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. 506 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987). The Dohnal court also relies on other cases
involving an interpretation of FLA. STAT. § 733.705(3). These cases take a "lenient" approach
as to what constitutes good cause. Cases mentioned are Arky v. Harris, 504 So. 2d 813 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1987); Williams v. Estate of Williams, 493 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1986); Johnson
v. Estate of Fraedrich, 472 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985); In re Estate of Oxford, 372 So.
2d 1129 (2d D.C.A. 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1980). Also consistent with this
position, which culminates in relief for clerical error, is Ricciardelli v. Faske, 505 So. 2d 487
(3d D.C.A.), review denied, 515 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1987). There is, however, a line of cases that
takes a "strict" approach to good cause beginning with the landmark case of In re Estate of
Goldman, 79 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1955). Estate of Goldman indicated that an extension of time for
good cause should not be granted unless there is a substantial reason that constitutes a legal
excuse; that the extension should not be granted where the failure to act within the appropriate
time period is the result of mere ignorance of the law, hardship on the petitioner, or reliance

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

constituted grounds for the statutory "good cause" exception in Florida
Statutes, section 733.705(3), a factor that should not be regarded as
relevantY7 Section 733.705(3) contains the expressed statutory exception, but applies only after the initial filing of a claim.- 76 Scutieri
extends to the initial filing requirement a concept of good cause. It
determined that when the delay in filing the claim is not substantial
and does not prejudice or surprise the personal representative, late
filing of the claim is permitted because "good cause" exists. 7 Scutieri's
extension is unwarranted despite the fact that Florida Statutes, section
733.702 is a statute of limitations. The purpose of the statute is to
provide relief from uncertainty when late claims are filed and to prevent unnecessary delay in estate administration8 An extension of
time should not be granted except for the traditional grounds of fraud
or estoppel, areas that are capable of delineation. Scutieri cannot be
justified on the basis of fraud or estoppel because the court makes no
reference to them. Scutieri, if followed by other courts of appeal,
would be the death blow to any semblance of reasonableness as to
the initial filing requirement. It would be difficult to say that any
untimely claim is barred. The law would be wide open to claims litigation. Read 79 provided the basis for Scutieri, which in turn produced
the "good cause" exception. Good cause is a factual matter and would
lead to a probate litigator's Pandora's box of alleged excuses for late
filings. Fortunately, in 1988, the Florida Legislature amended Florida
Statutes, section 733.702(3), as to all estates of decedents dying after
July 1, 1988, to read:
Any claim not timely filed as provided in this section is
barred even though no objection to the claim is filed on the
grounds of timeliness or otherwise unless the court extends
the time in which the claim may be filed. Such an extension
may be granted only in the estate administration proceeding,
only after notice, and only upon grounds of fraud or estoppel.
No independent action or declaratory action may be brought
upon a claim which was not timely filed unless such an extension has been granted.
on the advice of another. Id. at 847-48. Such an approach to the factual issue of good cause is
the better approach. Recent cases complying with the Estate of Goldman mandate are Golden
v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 481 So. 2d 16 (1st D.C.A. 1985), review denied, 492 So. 1332 (Fla. 1986);
In re Estate of Dezso, 382 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1980).
275. Dohnal, 506 So. 2d at 1139.
276.

FLA. STAT. § 733.705(3) (Supp. 1988).

277. Scutieri, 510 So. 2d at 1004.
278. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
279. 493 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1986).
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Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Estate of Pope
decided by the United States Supreme Court on April 19, 1988, shows
the growing number of exceptions to the apparent statutory bar of
section 733.702. Pope concerned Oklahoma's nonclaim statute 1 which
barred creditor's claims not presented to the personal representative
within two months of the first publication of the notice to creditors.m2
A claimant failed to file within the time frame after publication notice
occurred.2 At the state court'level the creditor's application for payment was denied, since publication notice was sufficient.28 However,
in Pope the Supreme Court reversed the Oklahoma decision.
The Supreme Court determined that if one's identity as a creditor
is known or reasonably ascertainable by the personal representative,
the Due Process Clause as interpreted in Mullane v. CentralHanover
Bank & Trust Co.3 and Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,ms
requires the creditor be given notice by mail or other means calculated
to give actual notice.2 The creditor's claim was considered to be an
intangible property interest protected by the Due Process Clause.ms
The Court indicated that giving actual notice does not unduly burden
a state's interest in the expeditious resolution of estate administration
since notice by mail is reasonably calculated to provide actual notice,
and publication notice will suffice for unascertainable creditors and
creditors with merely conjectural claims.2
While Pope concerned an Oklahoma statute, that legislation is similar to Florida Statutes section 733.702(1). The fact that Florida has a
three month, rather than a two month, nonclaim time bar will not be
material. Pope will control in Florida.2 ° Known or reasonably ascer280. 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988).
281. The statute at issue was OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 333 (1981).
282. Tulsa ProfessionalCollection Servs., 108 S. Ct. at 1342.
283. Id. at 1343.
284. Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Estate of Pope, 733 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1986).
285. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
286. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
287. Tulsa ProfessionalCollection Servs., 108 S. Ct. at 1344-45.
288. Id. The claim was for an unpaid bill and was considered by the Court to be a protected
property interest. Id. at 1345.
289. Id. at 1347. While the term "conjectural" is not defined it arguably would encompass
"contingent" claims.
290. Pope nullifies the holdings of Public Health Trust v. Estate of Jam, 521 So. 2d 309
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1988); Coley v. Estate of Odom, 500 So. 2d 188 (1st D.C.A. 1986), review
denied, 506 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1987). These Florida cases were consistent with the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's decision of Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Estate of Pope, 733
P.2d 396 (Okla. 1986) After the Pope decision, in a new opinion on recall of mandate, Public
Health Trust v. Estate of Jara, 526 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1988) determined that notice
of probate proceedings by publication to known creditors is constitutionally insufficient.
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tainable creditors must be given notice by mail or such other means
as is certain to ensure actual notice of the running of the nonclaim
period. Publication notice to such Florida creditors will be insufficient.
However, Pope involves only claims "arising upon a contract." 291
However, Pope leaves a number of issues unresolved. What kind
of search is the personal representative required to make to determine
whether there are any reasonably ascertainable creditors? California
thought it had resolved the due process problem with legislation passed
before Pope that becomes effective July 1, 1988. California Probate
Code section 9053 states:
(a) If the personal representative or attorney for the personal
representative in good faith believes that notice to a particular creditor is or may be required by this chapter and gives
notice based on that belief, the personal representative or
attorney is not liable to any person for giving the notice,
whether or not required by this chapter.
(b) If the personal representative or attorney for the personal
representative in good faith fails to give notice required by
this chapter, the personal representative or attorney is not
liable to any person for the failure. Liability, if any, for the
failure in such a case is on the estate.
(c) Nothing in this chapter imposes a duty on the personal
representative or attorney for the personal representative
to make a search for creditors of the decedent.2
The commentary to this legislation indicates that a personal representative need not make a special search for creditors but only has to
notify those discovered during administration. 29
3 However, the personal representative cannot willfully ignore information that might
impart knowledge of a creditor.2 Guidance in Florida will have to
come from changes in legislation after Pope or from any Florida Supreme Court revisions to the Florida Rules of Probate and Guardianship Procedure. In this respect, a revision of Rule 5.240(a) has been
proposed, effective January 1, 1989, to read:
After issuance of letters, the personal representative shall
publish a notice of administration and promptly serve a copy
of the notice in the manner provided for formal notice in

291.

Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1341.

292. CAL. PROB. CODE § 9053 (West 1987).
293. Id. Law Revision Commission Comments.
294. Id. Law Revision Commission Comments.
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these rules on the surviving spouse and all beneficiaries
known to the personal representative who have not been
barred by law. Within 2 months after first publication of
notice of administration the personal representative shall
serve a copy of the notice on all persons having claims or
demands against the estate whose name and location or address are known to or reasonably ascertainable by the personal representative. No such notice need be served on a
creditor who has filed a claim in the proceedings or whose
claim has been included in a personal representative's proof
of claim filed in the 5proceedings, or on a creditor whose
claim has been paid.2
While the nonclaim period still runs from the time of the first publication of the notice of administration, even if there is a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor who is promptly served, such should not
be the legislative approach if there is to be symmetry time-wise for
all creditors. Preferably the known or reasonably ascertainable cre-

295. Proposed FLA. R. PROB. & G.P. 5.240(a). The statutory time bar, however, runs
from the first publication of the notice of administration. See FLA. STAT. § 733.212(l) (Supp.
1988). A new subsection (e) requiring a statement regarding creditors, is to be added to Rule
5.240 and reads as follows:
Within four months after the date of the first publication of notice of administration,
the personal representative shall file a verified statement that he has made diligent
search to ascertain the names and location or mailing addresses of persons having
claims or demands against this estate. Such statement shall also contain the following information as to all such persons who have not filed a timely claim or who
have not had their claim included in a personal representative's proof of claim filed
in the proceedings.
(1) the name and, if known, the address of such person;
(2) an indication whether such person has been served with a notice of administration or otherwise received actual notice of the proceedings.
A new Rule 5.495 has been proposed also. It controls the contents of any petition to extend
the time for filing a claim and reads as follows:
If a creditor of the estate files a petition to extend the time for filing a claim, after
the time allowed by law for presenting claims, or a petition to require payment
of claim, which claim was filed after the time allowed by law for presenting claims,
and the petition alleges that the creditor was known to or reasonably ascertainable
by the personal representative, but was not served with actual notice of the proceedings, such petition shall specifically allege facts showing that such creditor was
known to or reasonably ascertainable by the personal representative. It shall also
include a verified statement that the creditor did not have actual knowledge of the
administration proceedings during the period allowed for filing claims against the
estate.
This rule provides for specificity in the relevant factual allegations of any petition based on the
concepts of the Pope case.
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ditor should be entitled to file a claim within three months after the
time of service. At the very least, such a creditor should have the
later of three months after the first publication of the notice or thirty
days after the date of service of a copy of the notice on the creditor.
In any event, Pope provides an additional exception to the time bar
of section 733.702(1), namely three months after the first publication
of the notice of administration.
Ironically, Pope may affect any potential impact of Scutieri. In
Scutieri "good cause" was never defined. It is clear, however, that
the personal representative had actual knowledge of the creditor, although the particular nature of the claim was not specified.
If
Scutieri's good cause extension for initial filing of the claim was based
on the known creditor status, its impact is now negated by Pope.
Scutieri held that publication notice did not bar the filing of the claim
in issue.-9 7 Pope would necessitate the same result if the claim were
based on a contract and was not conjectural in nature. Such a narrow
interpretation of Scutieri is logical and preserves the integrity of section 733.702 and is in accord with the 1988 amendment to this section.
Because of Pope an additional exception to its apparent statutory bar
exists regardless of the 1988 amendment.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This article has analyzed the status of a number of exceptions to
an apparent statutory bar in Florida's nonclaim statute, section
733.702, to claims not filed in a timely manner during the nonclaim
period of estate administration.
Barnett Bank v. Estate of Readm is clearly a leading probate law
decision. In this decision the Florida Supreme Court held that Florida
Statutes, section 733.702, although traditionally known as the nonclaim
statute by Florida attorneys because it limits the time for filing claims
against a decedent's estate, is a statute of limitations rather than a
jurisdictional statute of nonclaim.2 The best approach is to consider
the statute a special type of statute of limitations which is enforced
more rigorously than a normal statute of limitations.
With the nature of Florida Statutes, section 733.702 finalized, the
traditional fraud and estoppel exceptions to the nonclaim procedure

296.
519 So.
297.
298.
299.

Scutieri v. Estate of Revitz, 510 So. 2d 1003, 1004 (3d D.C.A. 1987), review denied,
2d 986 (Fla. 1988).
Id.
493 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1986).
See supra note 262.
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will continue to be applied. Fraud and estoppel are grounds that, if
shown to exist, would excuse untimely claims.3°° Expansion of exceptions took place in Scutieri v. Estate of Revitz.301 Scutieri added the
"good cause" exception as an additional ground for relief but failed to
delineate the parameters of the exception. Whether such expansion
is warranted, it did constitute valid law in the Third District Court
of Florida but is now negated by Florida Statutes, section 733.702(3),
as amended in 1988.A Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v.
Estate of Pope0 held that if one's identity as a creditor is known or
reasonably ascertainable by the personal representative, the creditor
must be given notice by mail or other means calculated to give actual
notice. Scutieri and Pope are completely consistent if, in the future,
Scutieri is narrowly interpreted, with the basis for the good cause
extension being the ineffective nature of publication notice to a known
creditor.
The 'trust exception," also known as the "equitable title or beneficial ownership exception" or the "specifically identifiable property
exception" is well established. This exception was fully delineated in
Velzy v. Estate of Miller 4 and is limited to situations in which the
decedent held property on behalf of the actual owner either by way
of express trust or some other clearly defined means °S The scope of
the exception was narrowed to apply only when the decedent was
merely in possession of property but had made no assertion of beneficial ownership prior to death.3 If beneficial ownership were claimed
before death, claim to the property would be barred unless filed within
the nonclaim time period because the dispute as to ownership, creating
the cause of action, arose before death. 3°
Despite statutory language, a personal representative can waive
the filing of the claim for third parties within the nonclaim period,
although not without the risk of potential liability. Florida Statutes,
300. The most recent ease emphasizing this conclusion is Campbell v. Estate of Schleusener,
504 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987). This decision was based on Read, 493 So. 2d 447. The
fraud and estoppel exceptions are now codified in FLA. STAT. § 733.702(3) (Supp. 1988).
301. 510 So. 2d 1003 (3d D.C.A. 1987), review denied, 519 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1988).
302. The rationale of the Scutieri case would not necessarily have determined circuit court
decisions in probate matters elsewhere. Compare State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1976) (as between District Courts of Appeal, sister district opinions are merely persuasive) with Smith v. Venus Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 343 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976)
(trial court located in First District Court of Appeal not bound by decisions of other districts).
303. 108 S.Ct. 1340 (1988).
304. 502 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987).
305. Id. at 1300.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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section 733.702(1)(a) indicates that a claim is not binding "even though
the personal representative has recognized the claim or demand by
paying a part of it or interest on it or otherwise. '" 8° One case has
recently stated that even though Read has interpreted section 733.702
as a statute of limitations and not of nonclaim, a creditor must still
file a claim.m This position is, of course, true if the personal representative is to avoid liability for the maladministration of the estate.
While it might appear that all claims are to be filed in court and the
personal representative cannot waive the filing, non-waiver applies
only to the fiduciary relationship with the estate beneficiaries. Waiver
was recognized as an excuse in Read, in which the bank asserted that
Florida Statutes, section 733.702 could be waived by the failure of the
personal representative to object.3

10

Filing was waived since the matter

was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of fraud or
estoppel11 Mere failure to object constituted waiver of the nonclaim

time bar.3 1 The court distinguished Twomey v. Clausohm313 because
it addressed to whom the claim must be presented, not when the
claim must be filed.314 With the 1988 amendment to Florida Statutes,

section 733.702(3), any claim not timely filed is barred even though
no objection to the claim is filed on the grounds of timeliness unless
the court extends the time in which the claim may be filed with such
an extension to be granted only upon grounds of fraud or estoppel.
Both personal representatives and creditors are required to adhere
to certain practices when dealing with claims subject to an apparent
statutory bar. The personal representative should object to all unacceptable claims, including those deemed to be untimely regardless of
the statutory exception. The creditor can then raise the issue of fraud,
estoppel, or inadequate notice, and the determination of the exceptions
will be evidentiary.

308.
309.
310.

FLA. STAT. § 733.702(1)(a) (Supp. 1988).
Stilwell v. Estate of Crosby, 519 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1988).
493 So. 2d 447, 449 (Fla. 1986).

311. Id.
312.

Id.

313.
314.

234 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1970).
493 So. 2d at 449.
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APPENDIX I
FLORIDA STATUTES § 733.702: LIMITATIONS ON
PRESENTATION OF CLAIMS
(1) No claim or demand against the decedent's estate that
arose before the death of the decedent, including claims of the
state and any of its subdivisions, whether due or not, direct or
contingent, or liquidated or unliquidated; no claim for funeral or
burial expenses; no claim for personal property in the possession
of the personal representative; and no claim for damages, including, but not limited to, an action founded on fraud or another
wrongful act or omission of the decedent, is binding on the estate,
on the personal representative, or on any beneficiary unless
presented:
(a) Within 3 months after the time of the first publication of
the notice of administration, even though the personal representative has recognized the claim or demand by paying a part of
it or interest on it or otherwise. The personal representative
may settle in full any claim without the necessity of the claim
being filed when the settlement has been approved by the beneficiaries adversely affected according to the priorities provided
in this code and when the settlement is made within the statutory
time for filing claims; or he may file a proof of claim of all claims
he has paid or intends to pay.
(b) Within 3 years after the decedent's death, if notice of
administration has not been published.
(2) No cause of action heretofore or hereafter accruing, including, but not limited to, an action founded upon fraud or other
wrongful act or omission, shall survive the death of the person
against whom the claim may be made, whether an action is
pending at the death of the person or not, unless the claim is
ified in the manner provided in this part and within the time
limited.
(3) Any claim not timely filed as provided in this section is
barred even though no objection to the claim is filed on the
grounds of timeliness or otherwise unless the court extends the
time in which the claim may be filed. Such an extension may
be granted only in the estate administration proceeding, only
after notice, and only upon grounds of fraud or estoppel. No
independent action or declaratory action may be brought upon
a claim which was not timely ified unless such an extension has
been granted.
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents:
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(a) A proceeding to enforce any mortgage, security interest,
or other lien on property of the decedent.
(b) To the limits of casualty insurance protection only, any
proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or the personal
representative for which he is protected by the casualty insurance.
(c) The filing of a claim by the Department of Revenue subsequent to the expiration of 3 months after the publication of
the notice of administration as provided in paragraph (1)(a), provided it does so file within 30 days after the service of the
inventory by the personal representative on the department or,
in the event an amended or supplementary inventory has been
prepared, within 30 days after the service of the amended or
supplementary inventory by the personal representative on the
department.
(d) The filing of a cross-claim or counterclaim against the
estate in an action instituted by the estate; however, no recovery
on such a cross-claim on counterclaim shall exceed the estate's
recovery in such an action.
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APPENDIX II
FLORIDA STATUTES § 733.705: PAYMENT OF AND
OBJECTION TO CLAIMS
(1) The personal representative shall pay all claims within 1
year from the date of first publication of notice of administration,
provided that the time shall be extended with respect to claims
in litigation, unmatured claims, and contingent claims for the
period necessary to dispose of such claims pursuant to subsections (3), (4), and (5). The court may extend the time for payment
of any claim upon a showing of good cause. No personal representative shall be compelled to pay the debts of the decedent
until after the expiration of 4 months from the first publication
of notice of administration. If any person brings an action against
a personal representative within the 4 months on any claim to
which the personal representative has filed no objection, the
plaintiff shall not receive any costs or attorneys' fees if he prevails, nor shall the judgment change the class of the claim for
payment under this code.
(2) On or before the expiration of 4 months from the first
publication of notice of administration or within 30 days from
the timely filing of a claim, whichever occurs later, a personal
representative or other interested person may file a written
objection to a claim. Any objection by an interested person to
a personal representative's proof of claim shall state the particular item or items to which the interested person objects. If an
objection is filed, the person filing it shall serve a copy of the
objection by registered or certified mail to the address of the
claimant or the claimant's attorney as shown on the claim or by
delivery to the claimant to whose claim the person objects or
the claimant's attorney of record, if any, not later than 10 days
after the objection has been filed, and also on the personal representative if the objection is filed by any interested person
other than the personal representative. The failure to serve a
copy of the objection constitutes an abandonment of the objection. For good cause, the court may extend the time for filing
an objection to any claim or may extend the time for serving
the objections. The extension of time shall be granted only after
notice.
(3) The claimant is limited to a period of 30 days from the
date of service of an objection within which to bring an independent action upon the claim, or a declaratory action to establish
the validity and amount of an unmatured claim which is not yet
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due but which is certain to become due in the future, or a
declaratory action to establish the validity of a contingent claim
upon which no cause of action has accrued on the date of service
of an objection and that may or may not become due in the
future. For good cause, the court may extend the time for filing
an action or proceeding after objection is filed. The extension
of time shall be granted only after notice. No action or proceeding
on the claim shall be brought against the personal representative
after the time limited above, and any such claim is thereafter
forever barred without any court order. If an objection is filed
to the claim of any creditor and an action is brought by the
creditor to establish his claim, a judgment establishing the claim
shall give it no priority over claims of the same class to which
it belongs.
(4) If an unmatured claim has not become due before the
time for distribution of an estate, the personal representative
may prepay the full amount of principal plus accrued interest
due on the claim, without discount and without penalty, regardless of any prohibition against prepayment or provision for penalty in any instrument on which the claim is founded. If the
claim is not prepaid, no order of discharge may be entered until
the creditor and personal representative have filed an agreement
disposing of the claim, or in the absence of an agreement until
the court provides for payment by one of the following methods:
(a) Requiring the personal representative to reserve such
assets as the court determines to be adequate to pay the claim
when it becomes due; in fixing the amount to be reserved, the
court may determine the value of any security or collateral to
which the creditor may resort for payment of the claim and may
direct the reservation, if necessary, of sufficient assets to pay
the claim or to pay the difference between the value of any
security or collateral and the amount necessary to pay the claim.
If the estate is insolvent, the court may direct a proportionate
amount to be reserved. The court shall direct that the amount
reserved be retained by the personal representative until the
time that the claim becomes due, and that so much of the reserved amount as is not used for payment be distributed thereafter according to law;
(b) Requiring that the claim be adequately secured by a
mortgage, pledge, bond, trust, guaranty, or other security, as
may be determined by the court, the security to remain in effect
until the time that the claim becomes due, and that so much of
the security or collateral as is not needed for payment by distributed thereafter according to law; or
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(c) Making such other provision for the disposition or satisfaction of the claim as is equitable, and in a manner so as not to
delay unreasonably the closing of the estate.
(5) If no cause of action has accrued on a contingent claim
before the time for distribution of an estate, no order of discharge
may be entered until the creditor and the personal representative
have filed an agreement disposing of the claim or, in the absence
of such agreement, until:
(a) The court determines that the claim is adequately secured
or that it has no value,
(b) Three months from the date on which a cause of action
accrues upon the claim, provided that no action on the claim is
then pending,
(c) Five years from the date of first publication of notice of
administration, or
(d) The court provides for payment of the claim upon the
happening of the contingency by one of the methods described
in paragraph (a), paragraph (b), or paragraph (c) of subsection
(4), whichever occurs first. No action or proceeding may be
brought against the personal representative on the claim after
the time limited above, and any such claim shall thereafter be
forever barred without order of court. If an action is brought
within the time limited above, a judgment establishing the claim
shall give it no priority over claims of the same class to which
it belongs.
(6) No interest shall be paid by the personal representative
or allowed by the court on a claim until the expiration of 5
calendar months from the first publication of the notice of administration, unless the claim is founded on a written obligation of
the decedent providing for the payment of interest. Interest
shall be paid by the personal representative on written obligations of the decedent providing for the payment of interest. On
all other claims, interest shall be allowed and paid beginning 5
months from the first publication of the notice of administration.
(7) The court may determine all issues concerning claims or
matters not requiring trial by jury.
(8) An order for extension of time authorized under this section may be entered only in the estate administration proceeding.
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